Using the Good, Old Criminal Justice System: Worth a Try?

WANTED:
PUBLIC ENEMY #1
Alphonse Gabriel Capone

I live a few blocks from the site of the (in)famous St. Valentine's Day Massacre. The garage in which the gangland ambush took place is no longer standing; it's now a grassy hillock in a building complex. ("Nothing to see here ... move along!")

And, the last time I paid attention to such things, Chicago was still identified in the minds of people around the world first and foremost with its criminal history. Predictably, when I used to tell people I met in China that I was from Chicago, they would smile, form their two hands into a "tommy gun" gesture, say "Chicago! Al Capone!" and spray me with "bullets."

Ancient history, yes, but still, there are lessons to be learned. Is there really any difference between the crimes of "gangsters" -- the way the criminal justice system counters them -- and the actions of "terrorists"?

Criminal law . . . military justice . . . and "in-between"

The story of the past decade-plus has been the story of the assertion by some that the conception of law that our society has is not sufficient.  Simply put, there are those who say that there is a third, "in-between" category of behavior -- and legal status -- that is not civilian (subject to criminal law) and not military (subject to military law and the laws of war).

What this has meant that a whole range of behaviors -- ranging from acteually killing someone to simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, or being related to the wrong person, or engaging in loose talk -- have been labeled as "terrorism" or worse and been punished by summary execution.

Most notably, this has been enshrined in the "unlawful enemy combatant" status used to justify Guantanamo detention and the surreal Obama administration definition of "due process" used to justify extrajudicial execution by drone.

Supposedly there are characteristics of behavior that justify the application of this new, "in-between" status -- a status which, unfortunately for all of us, is a legal no-man's-land.

But doesn't the history of the prosecution of organized crime in the United States prove that the law works? Even when dealing with very violent people?

The role of technology

Technology in the Capone era

There's an interesting argument that the difference today is technology: the "bad guys"can make use of technology that is advancing so quickly that conventional law enforcement can't compete. Easy communications, travel, and banking make it too easy to be a threat to society.

Ironically, the complaints about "technology" only started to come after the the new weapons that the West was so thrilled to supply to fighters in Afghanistan -- like Stinger missiles -- got pointed back at us.

. .. which is a reminder the real technology we feel most threatened by are not cellphones, plane tickets, and bank transfers, but military weapons and state-generated threats like biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

And, after all, wasn't the story of the Capone era also the story of the organized use of new technologies like cars, phones, and tommy guns? (And creative accounting?)

(Umm . . . does social context have anything to do with it?)

I recently saw Bonnie and Clyde. I was struck by the way in which Clyde Barrow could say "We rob banks!" with such confidence: he knew that, as likely as not, people would feel no love lost for the banks.

The Prohibition Era that empowered Capone was similarly an era that made people cynical about "law and order."  Corruption breeds corruption. (That may have been the origin of the unofficial motto of the City of Chicago: "Where's mine?")

One of the characteristics of the "in-between enemies" that the U.S. finds opposing it in so many parts of the world is that they have sympathizers. To be blunt: a lot of people around the world think the U.S. means them ill.  The U.S. would do well to supplement its sophisticated and expensive law enforcement efforts with some good old-fashioned soul-searching: we need to get honest with ourselves into the root causes of these attitudes.

In love with being at war

Cartoon courtesy John Jonik

The biggest thing holding our government back from reverting to a straight "criminal justice" approach to people who commit crimes against us is that it might mean it would have to abandon the war trope: the "global war on terror" . . . the "war on drugs" . . . .

At the end of the day, the most salient feature of the "in-between" status we have bestowed on our enemies is that it allows for maximum war-making and maximum war-talk with a minimum of war governance. What we've ended up with is a state of permanent war united with a zero accountability government.

Where's Eliot Ness when you need him?

Related posts

I think the U.S. is in the midst of a big shift.  I think that for over a decade following 9/11 people have been so enmeshed in fear that their instincts weren't working properly. I think that we are in the midst of a slow process of awakening: people are emerging from the shadow of fear to a wider range of sensibility -- and they are realizing there are some things that are out of joint.

(See Too Much State Power? (Asymmetric Warfare and Asymmetric Policing))

If the public will join us in asking the question "Who decides?" about drone executions, I believe they will rapidly come to realize that they are utterly dissatisfied with what the government is saying.

(See Who Decides? (When Drones are Judge, Jury, and Executioner) )

A September 5, 2013, U.S. drone strike in Pakistan killed six people - including Sangeen Zadran -- a "senior militant commander" who was "implicated in a long-running kidnapping drama involving an American soldier."

(See September 5 in Pakistan: Another Day, Another Drone Killing)








Attorney General Eric Holder stepped down last week. Mainstream media commentaries on his legacy are all over the map.  Perhaps it would be fruitful for one or more law school to avail itself of this stock-taking moment. What happened? Why?


(See Detention USA: EVERYBODY is Starting to Ask Questions! )


I'm awed by the apparent way in which the framers stepped up to the plate to write rules that bring about a new way of governing, in contrast to the one they had just stepped away from.

(See An Evening's Entertainment in D.C.: U.S. Constitution 101 )









The U.S. Constitution has become a second class citizen in 2010 America; at least while there are more important things like health care reform to accomplish.

(See Rahm to Constitution: Drop Dead )

October 28 in Somalia: Another Day, Another Drone Killing

When you start to look at the way U.S. drone killings are reported -- as I did with the September 5 drone killing in Pakistan -- you notice that the U.S. government has a modus operandi for pulling the wool over our eyes, and then making us all complicit in the process.

Hence the extreme urgency that the U.S. comply with the call by the U.N. for full accountability for its drone killing program.

Following our own modus operandi for breaking down the current U.S. practice of deception, below is a look at the Tuesday, October 29, 2013, New York Times account of a drone strike in Somalia the previous day: Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike in Somalia . As with the September 5 account from Pakistan, this short account is a case study in what is wrong with the U.S. drone wars.


(1) No due process

The most obvious fact is that people were killed by the U.S. using drones without due process of law. This can only be understood as an extrajudicial execution, i.e. a war crime.

The most prominent victim of the drone strike was Ibrahim Ali --"an explosives specialist for the Shabab known for his skill in building and using homemade bombs and suicide vests."

We are told, "He’s been identified as someone we’ve been tracking for a long time." (Hmmm ... almost identical to the statement made about the September 5 victim.)

The newspaper account makes sure to remind us of the role of the Shabab in "the bloody siege at a shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, last month in which more than 60 men, women and children were killed." Presumably we are supposed to connect the dots between that event and this execution ourselves.

Once again, the U.S. government is using the media to try, convict, and execute someone.  We need to continue to insist instead on due process.

(As with my previous post, I'm focusing here on the legal issues that affect the individual. The violation of national sovereignty -- including the implication that Somalia is complicit in U.S. violations -- will be the subject of an entire separate post.)


(2) False witness

As usual, the New York Times account repeats characterizations of the victims in a way that tends to imply that they "had it coming."

Another resident, Liban Dahir, said that he saw militants remove two bodies from a burning car. “I don’t know exactly who was targeted, but I confirm that the car was carrying Shabab members,” Mr. Dahir said. The men were carrying guns and wore black scarves that hid their faces, he said.

And, as often happens, guilt is imputed through geography: the targeted car was "traveling to Baraawe, a coastal town that is one of the [Shabab] group’s strongholds."

The New York Times  uncritically passes along characterizations of people in a way that is damning. It is a deeply immoral course of conduct.

Following the usual m.o., the web of allegations is continued in more detail on the website of the Long War Journal.

Untitled
by Alfonso Munoz

(3) Collateral damage?

There is no report of people besides the intended target being killed - unless you count the other person in the car with Ibrahim Ali.

(4) The "network" trope

As usual, the New York Times account is propelled by the notion of the "networks" that the victims were involved in.

There are also domestic concerns for the administration, since about 30 Somali-American men have left their homes in places like Minneapolis and Columbus, Ohio, to fight among the Shabab’s ranks in Somalia. F.B.I. officials have sought to closely monitor any battle-tested young men returning to the United States for signs of radicalization and possible plans to conduct attacks on American soil.

Isn't the implication here that this extrajudicial execution is a small price to pay in the larger project of "managing" radicalized Americans?


(5) What is the social function that "militant" leaders provide in Somalia?

To its credit, the account suggests that we need to get beyond the simple stereotypes about "militants" in other countries -- particularly the stereotype that says "it's all about us."

Some argued that American strikes might only incite Shabab operatives, transforming the group from a regional organization focused on repelling foreign troops from Somalia into one with an agenda akin to Al Qaeda’s: striking the West at every turn. 

(6) Are we just feeding the real source of the problem?

Most important of all, when we read accounts such as these, we should ask ourselves: "Isn't this exactly what feeds hatred against the United States abroad? How can this possibly be suggested as a way to make Americans safer and the world a better place?"


Related posts

A September 5, 2013, U.S. drone strike in Pakistan killed six people - including Sangeen Zadran -- a "senior militant commander" who was "implicated in a long-running kidnapping drama involving an American soldier."

(See September 5 in Pakistan: Another Day, Another Drone Killing)

A new U.N. report makes it clear that the U.S. has to report fully on all its drone attacks.

(See 2014: The Year of Transparency (for U.S. Drone Use)?)








If the public will join us in asking the question "Who decides?" about drone executions, I believe they will rapidly come to realize that they are utterly dissatisfied with what the government is saying.

(See Who Decides? (When Drones are Judge, Jury, and Executioner) )

2014: The Year of Transparency (for U.S. Drone Use)?

In a post several weeks ago, I pointed to the way the media is being used in an unacceptable way to glide past the public's need to know the truth about U.S. drone killings.

Now, the United Nations is on the case.

In the newly-issue report of UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, there is a clear call for a big change:

[RECOMMENDATION] 108. States must be transparent about the development, acquisition and use of armed drones. They must publicly disclose the legal basis for the use of drones, operational responsibility, criteria for targeting, impact (including civilian casualties), and information about alleged violations, investigations and prosecutions.

[RECOMMENDATION] 110. States must ensure meaningful oversight of the use of drones and, where appropriate, investigation and accountability as well as reparations for their misuse.

In other words, no more sweeping the killings under the rug. The report makes clear that the U.S. has to report fully on all its drone attacks:

98. The various components of transparency require that the criteria for targeting and the authority that approves killings be known and that drone operations be placed in institutions that are able to disclose to the public the methods and findings of their intelligence, criteria used in selection of targets and precautions incorporated in such criteria.

99. One of the criticisms levelled against the current drone programmes has been the absence of an official record regarding the persons killed. States must also give guarantees of non-repetition and give effect to the right to reparations of victims of drone strikes.

100. Drone victims, just as any other human rights victims, and society at large have a right to have access to information relating to allegations of human rights violations and their investigation. The Human Rights Council has emphasized the need under international human rights law for transparency, highlighting victims’ right to know the truth about the perpetrators, their accomplices and their motives there. Likewise, during an armed conflict, relatives of persons killed or missing have the right to know the fate of their relatives.

It's there in black and white: heavy-duty reporting and verification requirements.

There's lots more, and I encourage everyone to read the full 24-page report: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. But the above recommendations alone are crucial for laying the groundwork for everything that we are trying to do to put a stop to the U.S. drone killings. It all starts with getting the truth out in the open.

Questions for follow-up

(1) Will media outlets commit to boycott all off-the-record sourcing about U.S. drone killing, and support the call for full, on-the-record transparency by the U.S. government?

(2) Will the U.S. affirmatively comply with its obligations ["97. Accountability for violations of international human rights law (or international humanitarian law) is not a matter of choice or policy; it is a duty under domestic and international law"] by creating a full public register of all drone killings that it has carried out -- by date certain?

(3) Will the U.S. honor recommendation 112 ("Drone operators must not be placed within a chain of command that requires them to report within institutions that are unable to disclose their operations") by immediately terminating CIA drone operations, as well as all other secret drone operations?


No one has any illusions that getting the United States to obey the law will be easy. But at least now -- with the member states of the UN stating what's required in black and white -- we have a start.


Related posts

First Reps. Raúl M. Grijalva (D-AZ) and Keith Ellison (D-MN) called the U.S. on the carpet for dodging the call from the international community to come clean about its drone killings. Then Reps. Adam Schiff (D-CA) and Walter Jones (R-NC) submitted a bill calling for drone transparency. So ... are we finally going to get the truth?

(See REAL Progressives Demand that the U.S. Come Clean on Drone Killings)

At the end of the first day of the 2012 CODEPINK drone conference, I came to a realization: the fundamental problem that we had all gathered to address is that drones render killing 100% invisible. And as long as the killing is invisible, we lose the most powerful tool we have for fighting the killing: the disgust and outrage of the general public.

(See Make Drone Killing 100% VISIBLE!)



We are allowed to know all about these killings, provided we're prepared to believe the statements of a person we can't confirm exists about a program which is not acknowledged to be happening. We are living in a nightmare that makes Philip K. Dick's dystopias look cozy in comparison.

(See Drones and Zero Accountability Government)












On Sunday, September 7, 2013, the New York Times ran an account of a drone strike that had occurred the previous Thursday: U.S. Drone Strike Kills 6 in Pakistan, Fueling Anger . This short account is a case study in what is wrong with the U.S. drone wars.

(See September 5 in Pakistan: Another Day, Another Drone Killing)













In other words, pretty much anybody and everybody gets lumped together with "terrorists"; the vaunted "precision" of U.S. military strikes isn't precise at all.

(See U.S. "Precision Strikes" in a Nutshell )

September 5 in Pakistan: Another Day, Another Drone Killing

Now that a date -- October 25 -- has been announced for the report by the UN special rapporteur on US drone killings, it seems like a good time to pause and remind ourselves of why the U.S. program of drone murders in Pakistan is so insidious.

On Sunday, September 7, 2013, the New York Times ran an account of a drone strike that had occurred the previous Thursday: U.S. Drone Strike Kills 6 in Pakistan, Fueling Anger . This short account is a case study in what is wrong with the U.S. drone wars.


(1) No due process

The most obvious fact is that people were killed by the U.S. using drones without due process of law. This can only be understood as an extrajudicial execution, i.e. a war crime.

The most prominent victim of the drone strike was Sangeen Zadran -- a "senior militant commander" who was "implicated in a long-running kidnapping drama involving an American soldier" -- Bowe Bergdahl.

We are told "the Americans had been after [Zadran] for a long time." It is very tempting to use the media to try, convict, and execute someone accused of being involved in the capture of a U.S. soldier. That is, however, exactly why we need to continue to insist on due process.

(I'm focusing here on the legal issues that affect the individual. The violation of national sovereignty -- including the implication that Pakistan is complicit in U.S. violations -- will be the subject of an entire separate post.)


(2) False witness

Sangeen Zadran
(Source: Long War Journal)

The New York Times account repeats unsubstantiated -- and unattributed -- characterizations of the victims in a way that tends to imply that they "had it coming."

The sources for the story are "Pakistani officials and militant commanders" including "a senior Pakistani official who agreed to discuss Mr. Zadran on the condition of anonymity" -- but there is no identified source.

I'm sure the New York Times imagines that it is merely reporting "facts" in an even-handed way, but what it fails to recognize -- in this as in all of its other drone war reporting -- is that it uncritically passes along characterizations of people in a way that is damning. It is a deeply immoral course of conduct, and one that readers of the the Times should, at a minimum, absolutely resist imitating and, at best, protest loudly about.

[UPDATE: This has now been stated in more formal language in the report of UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns:

75. . . . The claims that drones are more precise in targeting
cannot be accepted uncritically, not least because terms such as “terrorist” or
“militant” are sometimes used to describe people who are in truth protected
civilians.

(See full 24-page report: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)]

You can read the web of allegations in more detail on the website of the Long War Journal.


(3) Collateral damage -- as always

Untitled
by Alfonso Munoz

In addition to the "main" victim, nine other people were killed. This is buried in the middle of the article.

Presumably, those other nine were guilty by association with the main victim? Or guilty by dint of geography? (The site of the drone strike was Ghulam Khan, "an area bordering Afghanistan in North Waziristan, the main hub of Qaeda and Taliban militancy.")

Again: are we engaging in false witness when we -- even unintentionally and/or unconsciously, explictly or implicitly -- pass along the suggestion that these victims "were probably guilty of something" or "had it coming"?


(4) The "network" trope

The New York Times account is propelled by the notion of the "networks" that the victims were involved in.  The victim was a "leading figure in the Haqqani network."

In this context, this language has no clarifying power, but only serves to add to the imputation of guilt to the victims and to the perpetuation of a broader set of myths about the global "threats" against the U.S. that justify the "global war on terror" and all manner of unilateral and arbitrary U.S. violence.


(5) Significance of the public funeral

The one positive aspect of the article is the description of the very public funeral provided for the victims. The victim's funeral "was attended by about 2,000 people."

Alert readers will respond to this account by realizing that, whatever their other attributes, the victims were part of a community and the injury done to them is recognized as a harm to that community.

In fact, we are told that the victim was "the Taliban’s shadow governor for Paktika, the neighboring Afghan province." Are we supposed to hear this as more evidence of the victim's "liability"? Or should it instead give us pause?


(6) What is the social function that "militant" leaders provide in Pakistan/Afghanistan?

One man's "militant" . . . (Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf --
second from left -- with Hamid Karzai.)

It is time for us to start to try to understand more about the social function of "militant" leaders -- many of whom were U.S. allies in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf has been identified by Hamid Karzai as a possible successor in Afghanistan. He is a "militant leader" of extreme potency with whom the U.S. has been in a range of relationships over the past two decades. When is a "militant leader" an ally? And when is he someone the U.S. kills with a drone? And does any of this bear any relationship to the role of these people in their local society/polity?


(7) Are we just feeding the real source of the problem?

Most important of all, when we read accounts such as these, we should ask ourselves: "Isn't this exactly what feeds hatred against the United States abroad? How can this possibly be suggested as a way to make Americans safer and the world a better place?"

Eternal Scream by Michael Schwartz

Related posts

The U.S. has a modus operandi for conducting military strikes while slipping past any genuine public accountability. It's worth a look at the Tuesday, October 29, 2013, New York Times account of a drone strike in Somalia the previous day: "Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike in Somalia." It's a case study in what's wrong with the U.S. drone wars.

(See October 28 in Somalia: Another Day, Another Drone Killing)

A new U.N. report makes it clear that the U.S. has to report fully on all its drone attacks.

(See 2014: The Year of Transparency (for U.S. Drone Use)?)

Five big realizations I'm taking away from the 2013 CODEPINK Drone Summit "Drones Around the Globe: Proliferation and Resistance" in Washington, DC.

(See The 2013 DC Drones Conference: 5 Big Takeaways )

Will the UN Be Talking About Chemical Weapons Instead of Drones In September? (Why not BOTH?)

No matter which way the Congressional vote on Syria goes, it seems quite clear that the U.S. has teed up an opportunity for its ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, to direct the attention of the General Assembly to the question of chemical weapons when it reconvenes in the middle of September.

This is convenient, because without something else to focus on it has seemed very likely that the nations of the world gathered in New York City in September would finally get around to focusing on U.S. drone crimes.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power
with President Obama

Inarguably, there's nothing like the drama of the threat of U.S. cruise missile strikes to distract from the drama of U.S. drone strikes.

Ambassador Power, as a leading theorist of how the international community can and should respond to crimes by state actors against civilian populations, cannot be expected to forgo the opportunity to address the world on the issue when the UN General Assembly meets. And a legitimate question does exist: if a state attacks civilians, what recourse does the world community have? Can it hold that state "accountable"? Short of retaliating with military force?

"A Problem From Hell":
America and the Age of Genocide
by Samantha Power

This question is especially germane, given that the UN is expected to be holding a report about crimes against civilians by the dominant military power in the world. How, exactly, is the UN supposed to hold that power "accountable"?

So here's a modest proposal: the United Nations should use the occasion of the convening of the General Assembly to address both the actions of the Syrian government (including use of force against civilians) and the actions of the United States government (including the use of drone strikes to kill civilians and terrorize civilian populations). They should take up the difficult question: what is the authority of the UN to put a stop to crimes -- especially when the crimes are carried out by the powerful (or clients of the powerful)?

Useful background may be provided by Samantha Power's book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. Among its most useful contributions is to stimulate us to think deeply about the crime of genocide -- in particular, to think about it less in terms of the sheer numbers of victims and more in terms of the power relations between perpetrator and victim, and the effect of destroying communities through violence.

The Obama administration has suggested there is a "red line" -- a point where something needs to be done. Perhaps its time for the world community to join in that discourse.


Related posts

A new U.N. report makes it clear that the U.S. has to report fully on all its drone attacks.

(See 2014: The Year of Transparency (for U.S. Drone Use)?)

I hate to burst Congress' (and Obama's) bubble, but if the declaration of war on Syria they're debating is predicated on crimes involving chemical weapons, they're usurping the authority properly assigned to another body.

(See Chemical Weapons? Tell it to the ICC! )

The recurring theme of the The Hurt Locker is "We're done here." The tension of each encounter with a bomb is followed by the moment when the hero successfully defuses the bomb, and then announces "We're done here." The deeper theme of the movie is psychological: the solder is addicted to the excitement. He is unable to go on with a normal life. He keeps going back, again and again, to Iraq, to defuse more bombs. (HE is NEVER "done".)

(See DU: Will we ever be able to say "We're done here" ? )

Who Decides? (When Drones are Judge, Jury, and Executioner)

Abdulrahman Awlaki, killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen.

This past week I was in Madison, WI, where I saw a number of excellent presentations on peacemaking. One, in particular, changed my thinking.

Joan Haan and Elliott Adams gave a presentation at the Veterans for Peace (VFP) convention, "Creating a Culture of Peace: Exploring Nonviolent Social Change Movements Past, Present, and Future," which provided excellent tools for organizers. Part of their presentation dealt with three distinct aspects of public opinion:

• public awareness of the problem
• public opposition to powerholder policies
• public support for movement alternatives

(These three aspects are part of the Movement Action Plan model developed by Bill Moyer, as shown on the chart above.)

Our discussion turned to the question: where are we on each of these aspects when it comes to drones?

Public opposition

There seemed to be general agreement that we are making good progress in encouraging public awareness of the problem of drones.

Clearly, we are not yet at the point where there is broad public support for the alternatives being offered by the antiwar movement.

This then led us to ponder: might we, in fact, be on the cusp of a breakthrough moment when the public decides that they aren't buying the policies of U.S. powerholders with respect to drones?

As I thought about this in the days that followed, I became more and more convinced . . .

• It's time for our movement to move beyond stimulating public awareness of the problem -- beyond just saying "drones, drones, drones"
• The moment is not yet ripe for us to convince the public of commit to the alternatives we are proposing
• The moment is right to invite the public to shine a bright light on powerholder policies -- to decide for themselves, "Are you buying the government's story?"

In other words, it's time for us to do less telling and more asking, inviting, and listening.

In my opinion, all we need to invite many more people into the conversation is two words: "Who decides?"

Who decides?

If the public will join us in asking the question "Who decides?" about drone executions, I believe they will rapidly come to realize that they are utterly dissatisfied with what the government is saying.

(1) All the President's men?

Ever since last May, when the New York Times profiled the weekly Tuesday "kill list" decisions by Barack Obama and his inner circle, we've been aware that the President and a few close advisers think they have the right to huddle in the White House and decide who lies and who dies.

Is the American public really happy with the idea that we're back to rule by "All the President's Men" -- this time with drones?

(2) The CIA?

The largest portion of the U.S. drone killing program to date has been in the hands of the CIA. (Though this is not publicly acknowledged, because, well, it's the CIA.)

Who among the public -- really -- vests trust in the CIA?

(3) The generals?

Strange to say, the public would probably place more confidence in the leaders of the military -- at least when it comes to the use of drones -- than in the other possible alternatives.

Unfortunately, the leaders of the military are probably the least involved in decisions about the use of drones. (Perhaps we should hear more from them about that.)

(4) Contractors?

The Snowden affair has gone a long way toward exposing the involvement of government contractors in propping up the U.S. security state. However, we have not yet begun to see real public awareness of the number of civilian contractors involved in the drone "kill chain."

Is the American public going to be satisfied with the idea that these life-and-death decisions are in the hands of a bunch of IT contractors?

(5) Or does The Machine decide?

There is a very real sense in which the decisions to use drones to kill are being made by the machines themselves. That is, the relative weight of the system design and network communications in the outcome, relative to the weight of human agency, is becoming more and more overwhelming.

I predict that, at the end of the day, Americans will vote down the idea of computers, robots, and information systems being judge, jury, and executioner.


What do you think we can to spur public engagement with the question, "Who decides?"


Related posts

Now comes the messy part. We need many more people to engage with with the emotions aroused by drones. This is going to involve many different groups of people, engaging with this topic in many different ways: churches and faith groups . . . young people . . . . The point is: the discourse on drones is going to get out of our hands. It isn't always going to go the way we want. But the important thing is that many, many people are going to be talking about it in the ways that feel appropriate to them.

 (See Democracy vs. Drones)

By now, everyone knows about the New York Times article describing Barack Obama's personal administration of drone killing around the world. What few people are willing to face up to is that Obama 2012 partisans actually see this as a way to get a lot of Americans to like Obama: "This is the candidate; you MUST support him!"

(See Being a Team Player for "Mr. Forceful": Obama and the Dems )

First Reps. Raúl M. Grijalva (D-AZ) and Keith Ellison (D-MN) called the U.S. on the carpet for dodging the call from the international community to come clean about its drone killings. Then Reps. Adam Schiff (D-CA) and Walter Jones (R-NC) submitted a bill calling for drone transparency. So ... are we finally going to get the truth?

(See REAL Progressives Demand that the U.S. Come Clean on Drone Killings)

The impossibly upside-down world described by George Orwell actually turns out to be -- point by point -- the world we now live in.

(See Dirty Wars and Extrajudicial Execution (So 1984!) )

Drone Apparatchik Crocodile Tears

The lead story in today's New York Times, purporting to describe how certain conscientious members of the Obama administration do care about the war crimes that are being committed daily by them and their co-workers in the drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and who-knows-how-many other countries, is good news in at least one respect: it suggests that the vocal and growing opposition to U.S. actions with drones is being heard.

However, it's bad news in another respect. Look: clearly the sources for this article are the kind of "team players" whose first priority was to assure that their boss was re-elected in November. It is pathetic that they cannot even see how fallacious their own statements are: what, it was urgent to impose rules if Romney was using drones, but Obama's use of drones can proceed in a legal vacuum????

It is even more pathetic that these apparatchiks think that some end is served by telegraphing their twinges of conscience to the rest of the world . . . as if that somehow makes the drone killing alright.

If they really saw that what Obama and the rest of his administration are doing is wrong -- and if they really wanted to throw a wrench in the works -- there is a clear course of action.

Resign.

(Can you say "Cameron Munter"?)

When I see "unnamed members of the State Department and Justice Department" -- the people who allegedly are concerned that the Obama administration is doing something wrong on drones -- use their power of exit to influence their erring masters, I'll fly to Washington to shake their hands.

Until then, it's just crocodile tears.

Related posts

More than anyone else, the beneficiaries of permawar are the politicians who thrive on the power to make and control wars.

(See J'ACCUSE: The Beneficiaries of Permawar)

There can be no question but that Americans and the rest of the world will eventually wake up to the terror being inflicted in their name on Pakistanis and others. The only question that will then remain will be whether Obama, Panetta, and the whole drone "kill chain" will be prosecuted as war criminals or as ordinary criminals. (And God help them if they are condemned to the limbo of "unlawful enemy combatant" - entitled to neither civil nor military justice.)

(See #NATOvictims - Drone Strikes in Pakistan )

"In response to the consequences of war, each of us is presented with the responsibility to say something and do something to prevent more killing. For better or for worse, how we respond to the moral challenges of our times defines who we are, as citizens, as parents, as neighbors, and as members of the global community."

(See #RemembranceDay2012)

Why Isn't Robotic Killing Taboo?

Géricault,
Raft of the Medusa (detail)

When we think about practices that our society surrounds with taboos -- cannibalism, incest -- we tend to assume that those practices are extreme, and difficult to engage in.

But that is the point of taboos: that is what taboos are intended to make us think.

Because the reality is that the practices that taboos protect us against are the easiest things in the world.

In a society that eats meat, there is nothing easier than grabbing the neighbor's children and cooking them. To sexually active people, the most convenient sex partners are those who live in close proximity.

We have taboos against these practices despite the fact that they are convenient. The taboos reflect a recognition of social disruptiveness that outweighs the benefits of some limited subset of circumstances in which the practices happen -- and, more importantly, even the possible desires of the most powerful people in the society.

Géricault, Raft of the Medusa (detail)

For instance, we seem to encounter cannibalism mainly in hypothetical lifeboats where someone has already hypothetically died, and others can hypothetically survive by sustaining themselves on the flesh of the deceased. But the cannibalism taboo was established to prevent not this far-fetched situation, but the kind of flesh-eating that could be expected to take place every day without it.

Today, drones are set loose by the United States government day after day to kill people in country after country, and in the limited number of cases in which justifications are even proffered, they are extremely tenuous: "Well, we had reason to believe . . . on good authority . . . that the victim was engaged in preparing to plot . . . or was otherwise associate with . . . . " Drone victims in remote regions 6,000 miles away have about as much chance of defending themselves as hypothetical lifeboat passengers.

The problem with drones is that their computerized, high-tech, robotic, automated killing long ago came to outrun -- by a long shot -- any semblance of human agency in controlling them. And it's only getting worse every hour.

Théodore Géricault, The Raft of the Medusa

"An over-life-size painting that depicts a moment from the aftermath of the
wreck of the French naval frigate Méduse, which ran aground off the coast
of today's Mauritania on July 5, 1816. At least 147 people were set adrift
on a hurriedly constructed raft; all but 15 died in the 13 days before their
rescue, and those who survived endured starvation and dehydration and
practiced cannibalism." (Source: Wikipedia)

An exaggeration? Hardly. This is exactly the kind of activity that our society governs with taboo. We are indulging a fantasy that "reasonable" use of drones can be determined by logic and policy and jurisprudence, and all the while more and more people are being killed, and the technology is reaching the point of being uncontrollable.

The day will come when we would no more elect to office a person who believes in setting robotic drones loose to kill other people than we would someone who eats the flesh of their next door neighbor or has sex with their sister. Instead, we will cast such people outside of social bounds.


Related posts

I've suggested that it's time for a serious debate on drones, and that a good place to start is with Isaac Asimov's "Three Laws of Robotics."  Here are 10 questions that come straight out of the writings of Asimov and that can help spur the debate.

(See 10 Questions to Spur the Drone Debate )

In my opinion, the reason to focus on drones is this: when we focus on drones, the general public is able to "get," to an unusual extent, the degree to which popular consent has been banished from the process of carrying out state violence. (Sure, it was banished long ago, but the absence of a human in the cockpit of a drone suddenly makes a light bulb go off in people's heads.) It takes some prodding, but people can sense that drone use somehow crosses a line. And that opens up the discussion about how our consent has been eliminated from the vast range of US militarism.

(See "Why focus on drone attacks?")

Beyond recognizing the inherent contradictions of "pre-emptive violence," we must confront an urgent problem related to technology: the automation of "pre-emptive violence" -- e.g. via drone technology -- is leading to a spiral (or "loop" or "recursive process") that we may not be able to get out of.

(See When "Pre-emptive Violence" Is Automated ....)